Population Policies, Demographic Structural Changes, and the Chinese Household Saving Puzzle * Using combined data from population censuses and Urban Household Surveys, we study the effects of demographic structural changes on the rise in household saving in China.
Introduction
Household saving rate has increased dramatically over the past two decades in China, rising from 16.1% in 1990 to 21.5% in 2005 (see Table 1 ). Behind the rise in average saving rate, the age-saving pro…le has also evolved into an unusual pattern. In the early 1990s, saving rate was relatively low for young families, and it increased with the age of household heads until they were close to retirement. In recent years, however, household age-saving pro…les have turned into a U-shaped pattern, with younger and older households having relatively higher saving rates (see Figure 1A) . A more pronounced U-shaped increase in age-speci…c saving rates is observed from 1990 to 2005 (see Figure 1B) , as younger and older households raised their saving rates by over 10 percentage points, much more than middle-aged households.
1
According to the life cycle theory, young workers save little as they anticipate a rise in future income; the saving rates of middle-aged workers are the highest when their earnings reach the peak; and, saving rates become ‡at or even decline as workers approach retirement. Such a "hump-shaped" life cycle pattern is often observed in typical cross-sectional analyses in other economies (e.g., Attanasio, 1998; Jappelli and Modigliani, 2005) . Recent studies to explain the puzzling U-shaped age-saving pro…les in China have focused on factors such as the rising private burden of expenditures on housing, education, and health care (Chamon and Prasad, 2010) and the changes in life cycle earnings pro…les and incomplete pension reforms in China (Song and Yang, 2010) .
In this paper, we develop and test a new hypothesis that the demographic structural changes resulting from a series of population control policies since the 1970s have contributed to the changes in China's household saving patterns.
2 After population control policies came into e¤ect, birth rates for successive cohorts plummeted. Consequently, the demographic 1 These …ndings are based on China's Urban Household Surveys (UHS), which are described in detail in the data section. See Chamon and Prasad (2010) , Song and Yang (2010) , and Yang, Zhang and Zhou (2012) for systematic documentation of age-speci…c household saving patterns in urban China. 2 The demographic transition would also a¤ect other aspects of the economy. See Song et al. (2012) for a recent study on the inter-relationship between China's demographic transition and its economic growth and pension reforms.
1 structure shifted to a new regime in recent years in which young households have fewer siblings, middle-aged households have fewer dependent children, and old households have fewer adult children. Traditionally, the younger generation is supposed to provide old-age support to their elderly parents in Chinese households. Having fewer siblings, the young households will save more because of the increasing burden of providing upstream transfer to their parents. Households with dependent children can save more with the lighter burden of child care and education expenses. Older people have more incentive to save for old-age security as a substitute for the reduced number of children.
We develop a simple overlapping generation (OLG) model to illustrate how population control policies and demographic structural changes a¤ect saving decisions of individuals at di¤erent life stages. Incorporated into the model are key features of the Chinese household structure: parents raise their dependent children; in turn, adult children provide monetary transfers to their elderly parents as old-age support. The model allows parents to be altruistic (treating children as consumption goods) and to use children for old-age support (treating children as investment goods). Population control policies di¤erentially a¤ect the numbers of siblings, dependent children, and adult children for households at di¤erent ages (i.e., from di¤erent birth cohorts). The model predicts three testable hypotheses following binding birth quota. First, the responsibility of parental care increases for adult children with fewer siblings and their saving rate will increase. Second, households with fewer dependent children will increase their saving because of less mouths to feed. Third, the smaller number of adult children reduces old-age support for parents, thus encouraging the old to save more. These predictions demonstrate how saving decisions of di¤erent cohorts respond to demographic structural changes. The behavioral model provides guidance for estimating the relative contributions of various factors behind the changes in age-saving pro…le in China.
We test the model implications and estimate the e¤ects of demographic structural changes on Chinese household saving using combined data from the Urban Household Surveys (UHS) and population censuses. The UHS contains information on consumption expenditure at the household level, but lacks detailed information on fertility histories. Thus, we match The main empirical challenge in estimating the e¤ects of demographic structural changes on saving is the endogenous nature of fertility decisions. Our identi…cation relies on exogenous variations in cohort-speci…c fertility generated by the di¤erent timing of population control policies that a¤ected di¤erent birth cohorts and by the interaction of birth cohorts with …nes across provinces on unauthorized births under the one-child policy. E¤ective implementation of China's population control policies started in the early 1970s. The government tightened population control over time, and eventually the one-child policy was implemented in 1979. Given the timing of the population control policies, cohorts at childbearing ages face downward pressure in fertility, while leaving fertility decisions largely una¤ected for previous cohorts. The varying intensity of the policies over time also implies that their impact on fertility di¤ers for successive cohorts a¤ected by the policies. Under the one-child policy, each family is allowed only one child in urban China, and …nes are levied on second or higher-parity births. A unique feature of the policy is that the means of implementation and vigor of enforcement of the policy di¤er across provinces. In particular, the …nes on excess birth vary greatly by province and year (Scharping, 2003; Ebenstein, 2010) . We exploit the exogenous variability in fertility di¤erence between provinces with di¤erent …nes for successive cohorts that were exposed to population control policies of varying intensities to facilitate identi…cation. Speci…cally, we use the interactions of provincial fertility …nes with …ve-year cohort dummies as instruments for the number of children when estimating the e¤ects of demographic structural changes on savings. The important observation underlying the identi…cation strategy is that fertility …nes may have di¤erential e¤ects on fertility decisions of di¤erent birth cohorts with varying fertility history at any given point of time.
Note that this identi…cation strategy does not require fertility …nes to be exogenous.
Using cohort-level cross-sectional data for 1990 and 2005, we …nd systematic evidence that demographic structural changes have signi…cant and sizable e¤ects on saving rates. Younger households between 26 and 40 years old increase saving rates by 2.6 to 4.3 percentage points with response to one less sibling. Middle-aged households between 41 and 50 years old save 12.1 to 29.2 percentage points more with one less dependent child. Older households between 51 and 60 years old increase their saving rates by 1.9 to 4.6 percentage points if they have one less adult child. These results con…rm the three hypotheses derived from the model. Simple "back-of-the-envelope" calculations based on our point estimates show that the demographic structural changes as measured by variations in the number of siblings, the number of dependent children, and the number of adult children can account for a large portion of the changes in age-saving pro…le between 1990 and 2005. The rest of the changes can be explained by other socioeconomic factors.
Although numerous studies have attempted to understand the rising household saving in China in recent years, substantial uncertainty remains with regard to the driving forces.
Existing research emphasizes the importance of sharp cost increases in health and education (Chamon and Prasad, 2010) ; competitive saving motive arising from the marriage market (Wei and Zhang, 2011) ; structural shifts in life-cycle earnings (Song and Yang, 2010) ; and the constraints of the household registration system (Chen, Lu and Zhong, 2012) . Given the dramatic changes in demographic structure, the existence of little empirical evidence on its relationship with household age-saving pro…le is somewhat surprising. Several studies attempt to investigate the link between demographic structure and household saving at the aggregate level (Modigliani and Cao, 2004; Horioka and Wan, 2007; Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark, 2011) . Using household data, Banerjee, Meng, and Qian (2010) investigate the e¤ects of fertility and child gender on parents' saving decisions. They use a sample of households headed by individuals between 51 and 65 years old, and therefore only study the saving behavior of old households. Instead, we show that fertility in ‡uences saving behavior di¤erently for households at various stages of their life cycle. Aside from previous studies, we highlight how age-speci…c saving decisions respond to demographic structural changes, and investigate the shift of the entire age-saving pro…le over time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y describes the evolution of China's population policies and their impact on demographic structure. Section 3 presents a simple OLG model that links population control policy, demographic structural change, and household saving. The model provides a framework to specify and interpret our empirical results. Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the results on the e¤ects of demographic changes on household saving rates by age. Section 6 concludes.
Population Control Policies in China
China has witnessed major changes in its population policies over the past few decades, moving from encouraging population growth to strictly enforcing population control. In the early 1950s, Chinese families were encouraged to have children. The population rose from 550 million in 1950 to 830 million by 1970. The rapid population growth during the 1950s and 1960s led to the "Wan (Later), Xi (Longer), Shao (Fewer)"campaign of the 1970s. This policy called for later marriage and child bearing, wider spacing between births, and fewer children. Education, propaganda, and persuasion were the o¢ cially stated means of policy implementation (Yang and Chen, 2004) . Men were encouraged to marry no earlier than 28 years old and women no earlier than 25 years old. Couples were persuaded to allow at least a four-year gap after the …rst child before having another baby. Urban families were also suggested to limit their number of children to two. The total fertility rate plummeted from 5 close to 6 in 1970 to less than 3 by the end of the 1970s (Coale, 1984) .
However, population growth remained high; the baby boomers of the 1950s and 1960s were entering their reproductive years, and by 1979, approximately two-thirds of the population were under 30 years old. When economic reform was launched in the late 1970s, the government considered curbing population growth as essential to economic expansion and to an improvement in the standard of living. In 1979, the authorities tightened their population control and introduced the one-child policy, which allows each household to have only one child. Households were given birth quotas, and "above-quota" births were penalized. This policy aimed to limit China's population to 1.2 billion by 2000. After the implementation of the one-child policy, the total fertility rate declined gradually from just below 3 in 1979 until 1995, and then more or less stabilized at approximately 1.7 (Hesketh, Lu and Zhu 2005) .
Despite its name, the one-child rule does not equally apply to all Chinese families. Ethnic minorities are initially excluded from the policy. 3 For urban residents and government employees of Han ethnicity, the one-child policy is strictly enforced, with few exceptions. If both parents are only children, they are allowed to have more than one child provided that the birth spacing of children is more than four years. Families in which the …rst child has a mental or physical disability or both parents work in high-risk occupations (i.e., mining) are allowed to have another child.
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The State Family Planning Bureau sets the overall population control targets and policy direction. However, the implementation of the policy varies from one locale to another.
Family-planning committees at the provincial and county levels devise local strategies for implementing the state policy of population control, under the general principle of one child per couple. Residents of di¤erent provinces are subject to di¤erent birth limits permitted by the local policy (Gu et al. 2007 ). Economic incentives are provided for compliance, and noncompliance leads to substantial …nes and possibly other non…nancial penalties. Various studies have shown that these …nes are heavy and vary enormously across provinces. The …nes range from 20% to 200% of a household's annual income (Short and Zhai 1998; Ebenstein 2010 ). Even at the lower end of the range, the …nes are still substantial.
The rapid decrease in birth rate, combined with improving life expectancy, has led to a signi…cant change in the age structure of the Chinese population. 5 The decline in child dependency ratio (de…ned as the ratio between the children population aged 14 years or below and the working-age population between 15 and 64 years, expressed in %) and rise in old-age dependency ratio (de…ned as the ratio between the population aged 65 years or above and the working-age population, expressed in %) are the major trends in China's demographic structure (Figure 2 ). We further plot the more detailed population structure In this section, we present a simple OLG model to focus on the e¤ects of population policies and demographic changes by holding other socioeconomic variables constant. The model is useful in justifying the empirical speci…cation we use and in interpreting the empirical results. According to the model, changes in population control policies have di¤erent e¤ects on saving rates for individuals at di¤erent points in their lifetime. We will make these relationships precise in the model and form our empirical speci…cation based on them. In the empirical analysis, we will also consider the e¤ects of other socioeconomic variables aside from the demographic shifts induced by population control policies.
The Model
The economy is populated with overlapping generations, referred to as the children, the school-aged youth, the young, middle-aged and old workers, and the retired. We assume that people start making economic decisions when they become young workers. In each of the working-age periods, all workers supply one unit of labor inelastically. Let the socioeconomic environment and the information set available be denoted by : The after-tax earnings of the young, middle-aged, and old workers are denoted by y 1 ; y 2 ; and y 3 ; respectively. When people retire, they receive the pension bene…ts of y 4 .
A generic individual has children when young. Each individual has a utility function, u(c; f ); and extracts positive utility from both consumption (c) and quantity of children (f ) : For simplicity, we do not consider the quality of children. Given the socioeconomic environment, preferences for a young worker are represented by
where denotes the discount factor, and c i stands for consumption of an individual of age i (i = 1; 2; 3 refers to the three working ages, respectively, and i = 4 refers to retirement). In the empirical analysis, we will focus on the behaviors of working-age individuals between 26
and 60 years old. Almost all individuals have completed formal schooling by age 26, and by age 60, all Chinese workers are o¢ cially retired.
The model allows parents to be altruistic, and they pay q to raise each child. The cost of children incurs over time from a child's birth to school age, until the child becomes a working young adult. In the model, people have children when they are young adults; as the children grow into school age, the parents are in their middle age. For illustration purpose, we assume that the middle-aged parents pay the cost q for their school-aged children. The child cost q includes household expenditure on children in terms of food, clothes, and shelter, the opportunity cost in terms of parental time, and schooling expenses.
Following the Chinese tradition, parents also use children for old-age support. We assume that there exists a targeted level of old-age support for parent, R; equally shared by all adult children. Adult children are expected to take care of their elderly parents after retirement as long as they are around. Given that early retirement starts at around age 50, 6 we assume that a young adult pays his/her share of parental support R=n s to the old parent, where n s is the number of siblings (including oneself). If no uncertainty arises and every child pays his/her share, an old parent receives a transfer of R from all the children. Figure 4 presents the time line of inter-generational transfers.
Although almost all parents would pay to raise their dependent children, the old-age support paid to elderly parents follows social norm and is rather voluntary. If some adult children do not pay for their parents' old-age support because of mortality risk, …nancial di¢ culty, or in de…ance of tradition, the likelihood to secure old-age support from adult children would increase with the number of children. That is, the old-age support R becomes an increasing function of the number of adult children, or R 0 (f ) > 0: Furthermore, we assume that each adult child's share of parental care, R(f )=f; decreases in the total number of children.
Therefore, a young worker chooses the optimal saving decision by maximizing lifetime utility subject to the following inter-temporal budget constraint:
where r is the interest rate. The fertility variable f represents both the number of dependent children for the middle-aged households and the number of adult children for the old households.
Assuming log utility in consumption and separability in consumption and number of children, the saving decision of the young solves
subject to the budget constraint (2). Children enter parents'utility through function G ( ) ;
and the parameter measures the degree parents care about their children. The parameter represents the socioeconomic environment determined outside the model.
The Euler equation implies the following consumption pattern over the lifetime,
If fertility is optimally chosen, then the optimal number of children f ; given ; satis…es It is easy to show that saving rate when young equals
For a young individual, the saving plan for the middle-aged and old periods are given by
In the initial equilibrium, no population control policy exists, and the socioeconomic environment is …xed at : Equations (4) to (6) present household saving rates over the life cycle.
If we further assume that all households face the same life-cycle earning pro…le, interest rate and discount rate, then Equations (4) to (6) also illustrate the age-saving pro…le for a cross-section of households at a steady state equilibrium.
In our empirical work, we look at a cross section of individuals at di¤erent life stages.
There are two ways to interpret the life cycle decision of Equations (4) to (6) of a given individual in a cross-sectional context. The …rst way is to assume that di¤erent birth cohorts have the same (which does seem unrealistic). At a given point of time, Equations (4), (5), and (6) would apply to the young, middle-aged, and old households, respectively. Thus, a change in will have di¤erent e¤ects on individuals of di¤erent cohorts. The second way is to assume that di¤erent birth cohorts have di¤erent . Then, again, Equations (4), (5), and (6) would correspond to the young, middle-aged, and old households, respectively. Any change in will have more di¤erent e¤ects on individuals of di¤erent cohorts than under the …rst interpretation. Either way, Equations (4) to (6) imply that population policies would have di¤erent e¤ects on individuals of di¤erent birth cohorts and that the resulting demographic structural changes would also have di¤erent e¤ects on individuals at di¤erent life stages at a given point of time. The age-speci…c e¤ects of demographic structural changes will be further discussed in the next section.
Population Control Policies
In the context of household saving decisions in China in the past two decades, households face many uncertainties against the backdrop of China's transition to a market economy and rapid income growth. For example, the socioeconomic environment and demographic structure have both changed dramatically over time. These shocks will shift the saving pro…le over time. We are particularly interested in the impact of demographic changes caused by population control policy on saving rates.
Suppose the state population policy set the maximum number of children each couple can have at f and f < f : Given the binding birth quota, households make constrained optimization by setting f = f : Initially, households that had passed childbearing age were una¤ected by the policy. For those in ‡uenced by the policy, the policy might come as a surprise. For instance, a 26-year-old woman in 1977 did not anticipate the one-child policy and made a lifetime saving decision based on her optimal fertility rate, say f = 2. At age 28, the one-child policy was implemented, such that each family has a birth quota of f = 1:
If the household had not reached its optimum of two children, it would reoptimize at age 28
given the accumulated asset at age 27. The marginal e¤ects of fertility reduction on saving generated by an unanticipated change in population policy are di¤erent from those generated by the same but anticipated change in the policy.
Eventually, the economy will converge to a new steady state equilibrium in which all individuals are exposed to the population control policy and fully anticipate the fertility constraint. At this equilibrium, the consumption pattern of the households still follows Equation (3). Optimal consumption over lifetime can be solved by combining the budget constraint (2) and …rst-order conditions (3). The saving rates for households of di¤erent ages are determined by Equations (4) to (6) by replacing f and n s with f ; when lifetime earnings and other socioeconomic variables are held constant. As Equations (4) to (6) show, changes in the number of children or the number of siblings induced by the population policy have di¤erent e¤ects on the saving rates of individuals at di¤erent points of their lifetime.
It takes a few decades for all birth cohorts in an economy to be fully exposed to the population control policy and reach constrained optimization. A more relevant analysis for our purpose is to consider how households of di¤erent ages have responded to the implementation of the population control policies since the early 1970s. Speci…cally, we focus on three age groups in 2005, and investigate how these three age cohorts' saving behavior changes relative to the benchmark steady state equilibrium without family planning.
For the old households in 2005, their number of siblings is una¤ected by the population control policies. As the number of children (f ) goes down, as shown in Equation (6), two opposing e¤ects on their saving exist. The …rst e¤ect is the substitution between old-age 13 support from adult children and own saving. When people have fewer adult children, the net transfer T goes down and precautionary saving is induced because of old-age security concerns. The possibility that the precautionary motive induced by the reduced number of adult children could interact with other uncertainty also arises. For example, if public pension is reduced, people will rely more on private saving or children's old-age support for retirement. In this case, the reduced old-age support due to fewer adult children may induce even more private savings. On the other hand, an indirect e¤ect of the number of children on the saving of old households emerges. These households had fewer dependent children to support when they were younger. As expenditure on dependent children decreases, more income is available for consumption over the lifetime. Therefore consumption expenditure increases and people save less, as the second term in the bracket in Equation (6) shows.
Although the e¤ect of fertility decline on old households'saving is theoretically ambiguous, we postulate that the old-age security e¤ect dominates, especially when the number of adult children is considered. This assumption leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: As the number of adult children decreases, old households will save more for the purpose of old-age security.
For the middle-aged households in 2005, their number of siblings is also una¤ected by the population policies. After the implementation of the population control policies, these households have fewer dependent children and less mouths to feed. Thus, they can spend less on children and save more, as shown by replacing f with f in the second term in the bracket in Equation (5). The number of mouths to feed e¤ect should apply to any household with dependent children. This inference leads to the second hypothesis derived from the model that can be tested empirically.
Hypothesis 2: As the number of children decreases, middle-aged households with dependent children to support will increase their saving because of less mouths to feed.
Younger households in 2005 are not only subject to the birth quota, but their parents' fertility decisions are also likely a¤ected by the population control policies. Thus, they have a smaller number of siblings compared to the birth cohorts in the benchmark steady state equilibrium. In Equation (4), as n s declines, each person's burden of parental care increases and the net transfer from children T (f; n s ) goes down. Therefore, individuals will consume less and save more.
Hypothesis 3: As the number of siblings decreases, young households will save more to provide old-age support to parents.
Concurrently with the implementations of population control programs, China has undergone profound socioeconomic changes. The simple model presented in this section takes all of them as given and focuses on the e¤ects of population policies on household savings.
In the empirical analysis, we will try to make them explicit.
Data
Our empirical analysis aims to test the hypotheses postulated in the model and assess the effects of population control policies and demographic structural changes on household saving.
A data set suited to our purpose should contain the following information: …rst, accurate measures of household saving rates for multiple years; second, cohort-speci…c data on family composition, including complete information on the numbers of adult children, dependent children, and siblings for successive cohorts; third, good measures of time or regional variations in population control policies; and fourth, other household demographic information and socioeconomic variables that may a¤ect saving decision. To ful…ll the data requirement on saving rates, we need repeated household income and expenditure surveys. Although household surveys often have rich demographic information, they are typically residencybased; thus, a household member is observed only if the person lives with the household head. The majority of adult children and some dependent children in post-secondary school do not live with parents, and adult siblings typically live in separate households. Therefore, inferring the complete family composition information that …ts our need at the household level is not possible. The household sample alone is insu¢ cient to test the model hypotheses.
Our strategy is to construct a cohort-based sample that meets all data requirements using multiple data sources. The saving data we use come from the UHS conducted by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The UHS is an on-going income and expenditure survey of Chinese urban households, and it is known to be the best micro data on household saving in China. The survey also records detailed information on employment, wages, and demographic characteristics of all household members in each calendar year. The second main data source is the Chinese population censuses. The censuses contain the most comprehensive demographic information of Chinese households and provide information on the family composition of di¤erent cohorts. We match them with the saving information of the same cohorts from the UHS. We likewise collect province-and time-speci…c …ne/income ratio, which is the ratio between above-quota fertility …nes and annual household income under the one-child policy, as a measure for the strictness of the population control policy.
We also collect other socioeconomic variables that may a¤ect household saving from various sources. The strength of our cohort-based sample is that it not only combines the best available household saving data with the most comprehensive demographic information, but also contains policy variations that facilitate identi…cation.
For the current analysis, we use UHS data from six provinces that are broadly representative of China's rich regional variation, namely, Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shaanxi. Beijing is the rapidly growing capital city in the north; Guangdong and Zhejiang are dynamic high-growth provinces in the south coastal region; Liaoning is a heavy-industry province in the northeast; and Sichuan and Shaanxi are relatively less developed inland provinces located in the southwest and northwest, respectively. In the UHS, each household reports data on expenditure on di¤erent commodities. We construct a standard measure of household consumption that includes expenditure on goods and services (including rent), interest payments on mortgages, vehicle loans and other loans, cash contributions to organizations, and insurance premiums. We have also considered alternative consumption measures that exclude various items, which might be considered as saving.
Speci…cally, we …rst exclude expenditure on durables, then on health and education, which can be considered as investment in human capital, and …nally on mortgage payments. Income is de…ned as total disposable family income, which includes earnings, transfers, capital income, and pensions net of all income taxes and social security contributions. Saving is de…ned as the di¤erence between disposable income and consumption. 7 Saving rates are computed as the ratio of saving to income. Using alternative household consumption measures causes no major changes to the facts documented below, except for saving rates after retirement.
Saving rates after retirement are not quantitatively important; hence, throughout the paper, we shall focus on the saving behavior of working-age households with household head age between 26 and 55 (for female) or 60 (for male).
We use UHS data to construct household age- The saving de…nition we adopt treats social security contribution as taxes, but this contribution can also be recognized as mandatory life-cycle saving (Jappelli and Modigliani, 2003) . We are unable to construct a consistent saving measure including social security contribution because no information is available for social security contribution in the 1989-1991 UHS. For the 2004-2006 period, households on average contribute 5.2% to 8.4% of the household income to social security, with households between age 41 and 50 making the highest contribution. Therefore the 2004-2006 age-saving pro…le in Figure 1A would be higher and the U-shape slightly less pronounced if social security contribution is included.
in saving rates by age from 1989-1991 to 2004-2006 , as depicted in panel B of Figure 1 . The U-shaped pattern becomes more pronounced: the average increase of saving rates for those aged below 40 and above 50 is equal to 10.7 and 7.6 percentage points, respectively, whereas that for those between 40 and 50 years old is only 3.5 percentage points. The rise in the saving rates of the young and the old among working-age households sharply contrasts with the typical hump-shaped or relatively ‡at age-saving pro…le. We use the census urban samples in the corresponding six provinces to be consistent with the households from the UHS. In the censuses, all women between age 15 and 64 report the number of children ever born to them, and each person in a household can be identi…ed.
We consider three demographic variables that are investigated in the model and a¤ected by population policies. First, we construct a variable on cohort-speci…c average number of children ever born, for households of each age between 26 and 60 in 1990 and 2005 and in each province. Saving data from UHS are collected based on the age of the household head, but fertility information from census is for women. The number of children is therefore computed as a weighted average using the gender and marital status distribution of household heads. In the empirical analysis, we use this variable as a proxy for the number of adult children.
Second, we create a variable on the number of dependent children. Dependent children are de…ned as children aged below 15 and those above age 15 but are still attending school.
We count the number of dependent children each household has and compute the average conditional on the household head's age. Finally, we investigate the number of siblings each age cohort has. Although we have information on how many children people have from the population censuses, information on the number of siblings is unavailable. We proxy the number of siblings by locating their parents'birth cohort and collecting information on its number of children.
10
Panel A of Figure 5 presents the age-speci…c average number of children ever born from the 1990 and 2005 censuses. In 1990, the young households between 26 and 35 years old on average have one child. They were below age 24 in 1979 when the one-child policy was …rst implemented, and therefore were constrained by the policy. Those over age 35 have more children because the corresponding birth cohorts have had children or passed their childbearing ages when the one-child policy was imposed. The increase in the number of children by age re ‡ects both the cumulative fertility e¤ect over the life cycle and the declining fertility rate over time since the mid-1960s, under various population control policies. In 2005, the age pro…le shows a dramatic change: the number of children hovers around one for all households between 26 and 50 years old, and then it increases and reaches less than three at the age of 60. This pattern is closely related to the population control policies. Those aged between 26 and 50 in the 2005 census were all younger than 24 when the one-child female, respectively. We …rst compute the proportions of households given the heads' gender and marital status P j a;t . From the censuses, women of all ages report the number of children ever born, and therefore we have fertility information for all female cohorts F j a;t with j = 3; 4. Now assume single men have no children. Men tend to marry younger women, and we identify the average age of women, a 0 ; married to men at age a in year t: The weighted fertility for age cohort a at time t in our sample is then computed as P Combining household age-speci…c saving data from the UHS and the demographic information of the corresponding birth cohorts from censuses, we have constructed a unique data set based on age cohorts. We also explore the geographic variations in saving and demographic structural change. Average saving rates are computed for all households with the same age between 26 and 60 years old in 1990 or 2005, located in one of the six provinces.
Accordingly, demographic variables including the number of children ever born, the number of dependent children, and the number of siblings are constructed for the corresponding age cohorts in each time period and province. We also consider other variables that may a¤ect household saving. For each age cohort in the sample, we construct variables on demographic characteristics, such as the proportion of people having high school or above education, the proportion of minorities, and the proportion of state employees. Following Wei and Zhang (2011) , we use the local sex ratio for age cohorts between 7 and 21 to measure the competitiveness of the marriage market. The other province-and time-speci…c socioeconomic variable we consider is the government spending on social security per person, taken from the statistical yearbooks. Finally, under the one-child policy, the strictness of the policy can be measured by province-and time-speci…c …ne/income ratio for unauthorized births.
This aspect provides an important source of variation for the demographic structural change.
The …ne/income ratio is the ratio between above-quota fertility …nes and annual household income, taken from Ebenstein (2010) .
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The sample consists of 416 observations,   11 with an average saving rate increasing from 16.07% to 21.47%. As a result of the population control policies and demographic transition, the average number of children declined from 
Empirical Analysis
Our model provides useful guidance to formulate our empirical speci…cations, develop an identi…cation strategy, and help interpret our empirical …ndings. Although we mainly investigate the linkages between demographic changes and household saving, we will also incorporate other socioeconomic determinants of saving postulated in the literature into our empirical framework.
Empirical Speci…cations
Based on the three hypotheses previously discussed, we model saving rates as a function of the number of adult children, the number of dependent children, and the number of siblings to capture the e¤ects of demographic structure on savings. As we have shown in the behavioral model, changes in demographic structure have di¤erent e¤ects on households'saving rates age, year, and province combinations.
at di¤erent points in their lifetime. Therefore, the e¤ects of demographic variables on saving are age-dependent. In the most ‡exible speci…cation, we may allow these variables to have interactions with all ages between 26 and 60 in the saving equation. This speci…cation, however, is hardly feasible given the small size of our cohort-based sample. Instead, we de…ne seven age-interval dummies (i = 1; 2; :::; 7) corresponding to ages between 26-30, 31-35, ..., 56-60, by assuming that the e¤ects of the three demographic variables on savings are the same within each …ve-year age interval, but vary across age intervals.
We specify the following saving equation with the interactions of all demographic variables with age-interval dummies,
where S a;j;t is the average saving rate for households with household head of age a in province j at time t. F a;j;t and D a;j;t are the numbers of adult children and dependent children that these households have, respectively. N s a;j;t is the number of siblings. The seven age-interval dummies (i = 1; 2; :::; 7) correspond to …ve-year age intervals between 26-30, 31-35, ..., 56-60, and I ( ) is an indicator function that equals one if households'age a lies within interval i and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cients i ; i ; and i thus estimate the age-speci…c e¤ects of demographic structure on household saving. Age and age squared control for life-cycle saving e¤ects. X is a vector of other control variables. To capture macroeconomic shocks, we allow for a year dummy, u t . The year dummy may also capture the e¤ects of changing costs of children and old-age support over time on saving. We use province dummies v j to capture time-invariant and province-speci…c e¤ects. These additional control variables relax the theoretical model assumption that socioeconomic environment ( ) is …xed over time.
In the saving equation (7), instead of allowing demographic variables to have interactions with all age-interval dummies, we restrict our attention to selected age intervals for each 23 demographic variable. This speci…cation is mostly based on the empirical revelation of individual behavior and various speci…cation tests. Young workers may worry little about their own old-age security, and they may not have complete information about the total number of children they will have eventually. When they are approaching retirement age, the old-age security concern based on the number of adult children starts mounting. Therefore, the number of children e¤ect due to old-age security is most relevant for older households, and thus we consider the interactions of the number of children with age dummies between 46 and 60. 12 On the other hand, the number of mouths to feed e¤ect only exists for households with dependent children. Given the timing of the population control policies, the number of children that young households have barely changed from 1990 to 2005 as shown in Figure 5 . Thus, the rise in precautionary saving for old-age security induced by fewer children should be most relevant for the older households. 13 The cost of raising children is relatively low before they go to high school because of the nine-year compulsory public school system. After nine years, education costs increase, especially for college education. We have attempted to include the interactions between dependent children and age intervals 26 to 30 and 31 to 35, but both coe¢ cients are statistically insigni…cant.
14 Life expectancy was 68.6 years in 1990 and 71.4 years in 2000 (China Statistical Year Book 2005, NBS) . 15 Another concern on the speci…cation with full age-interval interactions is that the number of children ever born is highly correlated with the number of dependent children for households below age 45; however, as children become adults and leave home, these two variables become more distinguishable.
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Identi…cation Strategy
The estimation of Equation (7) on Chinese data poses a number of challenges. The main challenge is the possibility that individual (and unobserved) heterogeneity in saving behavior is related to the fertility decision. For example, if more frugal households save more and have systematically fewer children, the OLS estimates of the coe¢ cient on the number of children in cross-sectional studies will be downward biased. On the other hand, a shortcoming of studies that rely on time-series variation is that fertility generally trended down since the mid-1960s, whereas saving trended up. From a simple time-series study, determining whether the negative relationship between fertility and saving is causal or due to some other variables that have also trended over time is di¢ cult.
Another concern on our speci…cations is that the migration of households across provinces could bias the estimates. For example, suppose we observe the saving rate and the number of siblings of 30-year-old individuals in Zhejiang in 1990. If they were instead born in the province of Guangdong, our estimates are biased because the relevant number of siblings is that of Guangdong province. Prior to the recent tide of rural-to-urban migration, a Household Registration (hukou) System imposes a strict restriction on individuals changing their permanent place of residence in China. In recent years, although the number of rural migrant workers in urban areas has increased dramatically, migrant workers still have great di¢ culty in obtaining urban registration. Households that live in urban areas but have no urban registrations were not sampled in the UHS before 2002. The sample coverage has been expanded since 2002, but only slightly more than 1% of the individuals can be identi…ed as migrant workers even in the expanded sample. Therefore, our sample is essentially restricted to urban households with urban registration. For this group of households, measurement error introduced by migration is very limited.
Our empirical focus is the identi…cation of the e¤ects of the three demographic variables, including the numbers of adult children, dependent children, and siblings on household saving rates. The number of siblings is presumably exogenous to household saving decision, as one's 25 current period saving decision is unrelated to the fertility decision of their parents. We thus concentrate on …nding instruments for the number of adult children and the number of dependent children to address the bias caused by the endogenous fertility decision. China's population control policies substantially changed fertility for the cohorts exposed to the policies at their childbearing age. Important modi…cations have been made to the population control policies over time, and the means of implementation and vigor of enforcement of the policies di¤er greatly across provinces. The birth cohort and the province of residence jointly determine an individual's exposure to the population control policies. For example, a woman born in 1940 was 39 in 1979, when the one-child policy was …rst introduced. She had most likely passed her childbearing age, and the one-child policy should have a limited impact on her fertility decision. A woman born in 1960 was 19 in 1979, and was fully exposed to the policy. In addition, the intensity of the policy implementation measured by …nes levied on unauthorized births varies greatly across provinces and over time (Scharping 2003 , Ebenstein 2010 . We exploit the exogenous variability in cohort-speci…c fertility generated by the di¤erent timing of population control policies that a¤ected di¤erent birth cohorts and by the interaction of birth cohorts with …nes across provinces on unauthorized births under the one-child policy. Speci…cally, we use the interactions of provincial-level …nes for unauthorized births with cohort dummies as instruments to identify the e¤ects of the numbers of adult and dependent children on household saving. The population control policies provide the possibility of implementing such a technique as they have induced changes in fertility that are systematically di¤erent across the cohorts and provinces that we consider. Our econometric approach and identi…cation strategy are similar to those used by Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) , and Li and Zhang (2009). 16 
Estimation Results
We estimate our speci…cation (7) on the cohort-based sample and report estimation results in Table 2 . We instrument the number of adult children and the number of dependent children by the interactions of cohort dummies and provincial fertility …nes measured as a ratio of annual household income. Individuals in our sample were born between 1930 and 1979. Cohort dummies are de…ned for each …ve-year cohort intervals. The instrumental variables include the interactions between province-and year-speci…c …ne/income ratios and cohort dummies between 1945 and 1979, as women born before 1945 had likely passed the child-bearing ages by 1990 and were una¤ected by fertility …nes in either 1990 or 2005.
In the Appendix, we present the …rst-stage estimation results with the number of adult children and the number of dependent children as the dependent variables. In the …rst equation, all the seven instruments are negative and signi…cant, suggesting that the …nes have a negative e¤ect on fertility for cohorts born after 1945. The fertility …ne also has a negative and mostly signi…cant e¤ect on the number of dependent children for cohorts born between 1950 and 1979. In both regressions, the F -statistics for the joint test of the IVs are very large [F (7; 406) = 97:32 and F (7; 406) = 24:61]; which suggests that these IVs have a high explanatory power for the endogenous variables.
In Table 2 , we regress saving rates on demographics and other control variables. The numbers of adult children and dependent children are …rst predicted using the full set of instrumental variables, including the interactions of seven cohort dummies with province-year fertility …nes for excess birth. The table has six columns corresponding to six speci…cations with and without additional control variables. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses, and they are adjusted to take into account the use of the predicted values of numbers of adult and dependent children in the second stage. We let the coe¢ cients on demographic structure be dependent on age intervals as in Equation (7), to allow for the possibility that the e¤ects of demographic structural changes on household saving vary by age.
In column 1 of Table 2 , we report regression results with only three demographic vari-ables interacted with selected age-interval dummies. The number of adult children has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on saving for older households. One less child is associated with a rise in saving rate by 3.4 percentage points for those between age 51 and 55, and by 2.4 percentage points for those between age 56 and 60. In other words, as workers approach or reach retirement age, their saving decision begins to respond to the number of o¤spring they have as they start worrying about their own old-age security. Older households save more for the purpose of old-age security when they have fewer children. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. For households with dependent children, having less mouths to feed is generally associated with higher saving, but the e¤ect is only signi…cant for those between 41 and 50 years old. China adopts a nine-year compulsory school system. Public schools are relatively cheap, but the cost of college is substantial. This reality may explain our results, indicating that dependent children in their late teens and early 20s cost the parents the most. 17 This pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The number of siblings has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on saving rates for households between 26 and 40 years old. For workers who worry about old-age support of their parents, the burden for old-age care becomes eminent when their parents are reaching retirement age or have retired. If they have fewer siblings to share the responsibility of parental care, these workers need to save more. Our estimates indicate that one less sibling is associated with a 3.7 to 4.1 percentage points increase in saving rates for workers between 26 and 40 years old. These results con…rm Hypothesis 3.
The three variables re ‡ecting demographic structural changes have age-speci…c e¤ects on household saving; thus, one might worry that age could a¤ect saving rates directly, and the interaction terms are simply re ‡ecting life-cycle patterns. In column 2 of Table 2 , we add age and age squared as additional controls. The coe¢ cients on both age and age squared are not statistically di¤erent from zero. The coe¢ cients on the number of adult children, the number of dependent children, and the number of siblings are robust after we control for the life-cycle saving e¤ects. The point estimates have the same sign and are close in magnitude compared to those in column 1.
Although the estimates in columns 1 and 2 have identi…ed the e¤ects of the demographic structural changes on household saving rates in China, we need to ensure that our estimates are not mainly picking up the e¤ects of other omitted socioeconomic changes or policy shocks.
Given that the exogenous variations in fertility come from the time-and province-speci…c fertility …nes interacted with cohort dummies, concern might arise if the variables on adult and dependent children are simply proxies for other unobservable time and province e¤ects.
In column 3, we include the year and province e¤ects as additional control variables. The number of adult children is observed to still have a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on household saving for those between 51 and 60 years old, although the point estimates are somewhat smaller compared to those in column 1. The number of dependent children and the number of siblings have similar e¤ects on saving rates as before when additional year and province e¤ects are included.
In column 4, we include expected future earnings as an additional regressor to account for a life-cycle earning e¤ect. We estimate the discounted present value of future earnings for each birth-year cohort in every province based on prevailing cross-sectional age-earnings pro…les from the UHS and include them as an additional control variable. 18 Column 4 of Table 2 shows that the estimated e¤ects of demographic structure on household saving from this augmented model do not change signi…cantly, except for the adult children e¤ects on those households between 56 and 60 years old. Moreover, individuals who expect high future earnings tend to save less, although the estimated e¤ects are not statistically signi…cant.
Other factors have been widely used to explain saving patterns. In column 5 of Table   2 , we include the proportion of individuals with high school or above education and the 18 For simplicity, we assume that the prediction for future earnings is based on myopic expectation. Let y a;j;t be the average earnings of individuals of age a in province j at time t: For this age cohort in province j, their expected future earnings are determined by P 60 a i=1 1 (1+r) i y a+i;j;t where r is the discount rate set at 0.97.
proportion of minorities as proxies for saving preferences and welfare conditions, and local sex ratios to capture potential competitive saving motive (Wei and Zhang 2011) . We …nd that households with at least high school education save more than those with lower education, which is consistent with patterns found in other countries. Saving rates of minorities are not statistically di¤erent from those of Hans. The local sex ratio has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on saving rate, which is consistent with the …ndings in Wei and Zhang (2011) .
The existing literature has hypothesized that job uncertainty motivates the Chinese to save more. In column 6, we use the proportion of individuals who work for state-owned …rms or government agencies as a proxy for the degree of job security. The argument that declining social security can contribute to rising saving in China has also been put forward (Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Song and Yang, 2010) . We thus include per capita government spending on social security in a province as a proxy for the extent of the local social safety net. Under the precautionary saving hypothesis, saving rates should decline with better job security and better social security coverage. Both estimated coe¢ cients are negative and statistically signi…cant. These results support the precautionary saving motive, but the coe¢ cients on demographic variables interacted with selected age-interval dummies remain negative and statistically signi…cant. This outcome suggests that the e¤ects of demographic changes on saving are robust to the precautionary saving motive.
To summarize, we …nd strong evidence on the age-speci…c e¤ects of demographic structural changes on household saving rates in China. In particular, households between 51 and 60 years old will increase their saving rates for the purpose of old-age security if they have fewer adult children. The saving rates of middle-aged households between 41 and 50 years old will increase if they have fewer dependent children to raise. Younger households between 26 and 40 years old will save more when they have fewer siblings because of the increased burden of parental care. These patterns con…rm the three hypotheses posited in the model. They are also robust to additional controls on life-cycle saving pattern, expected future earnings, time and province e¤ects, and other factors posited in the literature, such 30 as competitive saving motive and precautionary saving motive.
Robustness Checks
Results in Table 2 indicate that older households save more for their old-age security when they have fewer adult children. Sons are believed to provide more support to parents than daughters, which is one reason why traditional son preference is widespread in China; households with more sons would save less if old-age security is the main saving motive. In column 1 of Table 3 , we examine whether the gender composition of children a¤ects household saving by including the proportion of sons interacted with age-interval dummies between age 46 and 60 as additional control variables. The estimated coe¢ cients on age-speci…c demographic variables have the same sign and similar magnitude as before. Speci…cally, households aged above 50 are found to save more when they have fewer children, even conditional on the gender composition of the children. We …nd some evidence that households between 46 and 50 years old will save less if they have more sons, conditional on the number of children.
These results reinforce the old-age security motive.
Some support for the precautionary saving motive among Chinese households has been found. Job security (state employment) and social safety net (public spending on social security) are associated with lower (precautionary) saving. Saving for old-age security motive is essentially one type of precautionary saving. When having a child is a substitute for saving, having fewer children is associated with a rise in saving to secure old-age support. Therefore, with job security and social safety net, households may rely less on children for old-age security. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 , we test for this implication using the interactions between state employment share and the number of adult children, and the interactions between public spending on social security and the number of adult children for households between 46 and 60 years old as additional regressors. The estimated e¤ects of demographic structural changes on saving are robust to these additional controls. In addition, the marginal e¤ect of adult children on saving is lower (in absolute term) for state sector employees (between age 46 and 50) and for those enjoying higher social security (between age 56 and 60). These …ndings are consistent with the old-age security motive.
Our empirical results rely on the identi…cation assumption that no omitted time-varying and province-speci…c e¤ects are correlated with the interaction of birth cohorts with the …nes for excess birth. The fertility …nes may depend on local (unobserved) demographic, social, and economic conditions. Therefore, the identi…cation assumption will be violated if saving decisions are correlated with these initial conditions, and it might be satis…ed only after controlling for these factors. Generally, completely solving this problem is very di¢ cult because many of the variables may not be observable or known to researchers. However, in columns 3 to 6 of Table 2, the ‡exible province and year dummies should capture most of these e¤ects. The spatial and time variations in the fertility …nes may also be a¤ected by past birth rates. Thus, we present in columns 1 to 6 of Table 4 the speci…cations that control for provincial birth rates in the previous year. After controlling for past birth rates, the estimates on age-speci…c e¤ects of demographic structure on saving remain close to those presented in Table 2 . Moreover, the coe¢ cient on birth rates in the previous year is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, except in one of the six speci…cations.
Implications on Changes in Saving Pro…le
Combining the estimated e¤ects of demographic changes on saving in Table 2 For households with the age of their heads between 41 and 45 years old, having one more dependent child is associated with a 12.11 to 17.57 percentage points decrease in saving rates.
Given that the number of dependent children for these households decreased from 1.01 in 1990 to 0.63 in 2005, as illustrated in Figure 6 , this factor would lead to higher saving rates by 4.60 to 6.68 percentage points across di¤erent speci…cations. In comparison, the observed average saving rates increased by 5.14 percentage points from 16.03% in 1990 to 21.17% in 2005. Similarly, the decrease in the number of dependent children is also a signi…cant contributor to the rise in saving rate for households between 46 and 50 years old.
For households between 51 and 55 years old, having one more adult child is associated with a 2.35 to 4.61 percentage points decrease in saving rates. The decrease in the number of adult children from 3.30 in 1990 to 1.54 in 2005, as illustrated in Figure 5 , would lead to a rise in saving rate by 4.14 to 8.11 percentage points because of reduced old-age support.
The lower-bound estimates would account for 63% of the actual increase (4:14 out of 6:55) in saving rates from 1990 to 2005, whereas the upper-bound estimates would over-predict the saving increase. Furthermore, for households between 56 and 60 years old, having one more adult child is associated with a 1.95 (insigni…cant) to 4.42 percentage points decrease in saving rates. A decrease in their fertility from 3.84 to 2.03 would imply an increase in the saving rate ranging from 3.53 to 8.00 percentage points, accounting for 40% to 92% of the actual increase.
These calculations indicate that all three dimensions of the demographic structural changes have quantitatively important and age-speci…c e¤ects on the U-shaped rise in agesaving pro…le between 1990 and 2005. It is not surprising that the three demographic variables alone cannot fully explain the changes in saving pro…le because many other socioeconomic factors have in ‡uenced household saving behavior over time as we have also found in Table 2 .
The "back of the envelope" calculations need to be interpreted cautiously as they are based on point estimates, and the instrumental variable estimator is known to identify only the local average treatment e¤ect (Imbens and Angrist 1994) . Therefore, the quantitative extrapolations are only suggestive. Nevertheless, we qualitatively show that the demographic structural changes can partially capture the overall rise in saving rates and the U-shaped increases of the age-saving pro…le between 1990 and 2005. In particular, the saving rates of younger households increase because of the rising burden of parental care with fewer siblings; middle-aged households save more as they have fewer dependent children to support; and older households with a reduced number of adult children increase their saving rates because of old-age security concerns.
Conclusion
In this paper, to resolve the Chinese household saving puzzle, we have postulated and estimated the e¤ects of demographic changes on household saving in China. To this end, we have studied China's population policies. The population control policies substantially changed the number of children Chinese households have. We exploit the variation in the changes in fertility for households from several birth cohorts and across provinces to identify the e¤ects of demographic structural change on saving rates. The results indicate that demographic structural changes have age-speci…c e¤ects on household saving decisions. When we use the estimated model to investigate the changes in household saving pro…le between 1990 and 2005, we …nd that younger households save more because of the rising burden of parental care with fewer siblings. Middle-aged households save more as they have fewer dependent children to support. Older households with a reduced number of adult children save more because of old-age security concerns.
As the one-child policy approaches the third generation, the "4-2-1"type of family structure becomes more pervasive, that is, a family with one child, two parents, and four grandparents. One unanticipated consequence of the population control policies is perhaps the increasing household saving. Our paper provides a new rationale for the relaxation of the one-child policy: removing the birth quota could potentially stimulate household consumption and substantially fuel current domestic demand. 
